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Abstract Considering computer systems, security is the major concern with usability. Security policies need to be developed to protect 
information from unauthorized access. Passwords and secrete codes used between users and information systems for secure user 
authentication with the system. Playing a vital role in security, easily guessed passwords are links to vulnerability. They allow invader 
to put system resources significantly closer to access them, other accounts on nearby machines and possibly even administrative 
privileges with different threats and vulnerabilities (e.g., phishing, key logging and malwares). The purpose of this system is to 
introduce the concept and methodology which helps organization and users to implement stronger password policies. This paper 
studies a password stealing and reuse issues of password based authentication systems. Techniques and concepts of authentication are 
discussed which gives rise to a novel approach of two-factor authentication. Avoiding password reuse is a crucial issue in information 
systems which can at some extent contribute to password stealing issue also. In the proposed system, each participating website 
possesses a user‟s unique phone number, telecommunication services in registration and recovery phases and a long-term password 
used to generate one-time password for each login session on all websites.  
 
Index Terms— Authentication, Network security, One-time password, Phishing.   
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
n the current public networks, since most of the activities    
are available on internet, user authentication is the most  
important part as far as security is concerned. Internet 
connected PCs are not „safe‟ anywhere, most of the user 
computers are infected with one or more forms of spyware or 
malware. Software key loggers are installed on a user PC along 
with common malware and spyware [8]. An increasing number 
of phishing sites also install key loggers on user PCs, even when 
users do not explicitly download or click any link on those sites 
[9]. Phishing is a malicious activity whereby an intruder 
(phisher) tries to trick internet users into providing confidential 
information (Dhamija et al., 2006). It is a severe problem 
because phishers can steal sensitive information, such as user‟s 
bank account details, social security numbers and credit card 
numbers by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an 
electronic communication. Although many more secure 
(typically also more complex and costly) authentication 
protocols have been proposed, due to the ease of deployment 
and usability issue; Passwords is ubiquitous technique for online 
authentication even in such an unsecure environment.  
Computer users are asked to create, keep and remind an 
increasing number of passwords for host accounts, e-commerce 
sites, email servers and online financial services. Usually, 
password-based user authentication can resist brute force and 
dictionary attacks if users select strong passwords to provide 
sufficient entropy. Unfortunately, the password entropy that 
users can easily memorize seems inadequate to store unique and 
secure passwords for all these accounts causes users be likely to 
reuse passwords across different websites [6], [7]. In 2007,  
 
 
 
Florencio and Herley [11] specified that a user reuses a 
password across 3.9 various websites regularly. Password reuse 
is the reason for users to lose confidential information stored in 
various websites if a hacker compromises one of their 
passwords. This attack is referred as the password reuse attack. 
Hence, passwords are a primary target of attackers for 
economically-motivated exploits including those targeting 
online bank accounts and identity theft.  
Some experts focus on three-factor authentication instead of 
only password-based authentication. Three-factor authentication 
depends on what you know (e.g., password), what you have 
(e.g., token), and who you are (e.g., biometric). To get 
authenticated, the user need to input a password and provide a 
pass code generated by the token (e.g., RSA SecureID [12]), 
and scan his biometric features (e.g., fingerprint or pupil). 
Three-factor authentication is a complete defense mechanism in 
opposition to password stealing attacks, but it needs 
proportionally high cost [13]. Consequently, knowing the 
limitations of single-factor (password-based) authentication, 
two-factor authentication is more possible and reliable even 
than three-factor authentication. Even though many banks 
implement two-factor authentication, it still experiences the 
drawbacks, such as the password reuse attack. Users have to 
remember an additional four-digit PIN code to work mutually 
with the token, for example RSA SecureID. We also have to 
consider, users can easily forget to carry the token. So, proposed 
system aims to improve the security and usability of two-factor 
authentication mechanism, as a result opposes most of the 
possible attacks and has a fewer requirements when compared 
to other systems. 
I 
II. LITERATURE SURVEY  
B. Parno et al. [2] proposed a system that  guards the secrecy 
and integrity of a user‟s existing online accounts so that attacks 
are no more successful than pre-internet scams (e.g., an attacker 
may still be able to access a user‟s account by weakening a 
company insider). System is based on the observation that users 
should be authenticated using an additional authenticator that 
they cannot readily reveal to malicious parties, authenticator can 
take a form of a cell phone, PDA or even a smart watch; in this 
method a cell phone is used. This scheme establishes the 
additional authenticator on a trusted device, for that an attacker 
must compromise the device and gain the user‟s password to 
access the user‟s account. Users cannot readily reveal the 
authenticator on the cell phone to a third party, and servers will 
decline to act on instruction received from someone claiming to 
be a particular user without presenting the proper authenticator. 
This technique is one of the first systems to avoid active Man-
in-the-Middle attack. In addition, the use of the cell phone 
reduces the effect of hijacked browser windows and facilitates 
user convenience. It is assumed that the user can establish a 
secure connection between their cell phone and browser and the 
cell phone itself has not been compromised. Again, Phoolproof 
is yet vulnerable to the password reuse problem and require 
physical contacts to ensure that account setup is secure. 
M. Mannan et al. [4] stated that the primary goal of MP-Auth 
is to protect user passwords from malware and phishing 
websites and to provide transaction integrity. Here assumption 
made that a bank‟s “correct” public key is available to users and 
mobile devices are malware-free. SSL connection establishment 
between bank server and a browser on a PC by using a bank‟s 
SSL certificate (as per common current practice). The browser 
may be tricked to go to a spoofed website or have a wrong SSL 
certificate of the bank or the verifying certificating authority. 
Denial-of-service (DoS) attack not addressed. Despite of that, 
MP-Auth suffers from password reuse vulnerability. An invader 
can compromise a weak server, e.g., a server without security 
patches to gain a victim‟s password and use it to get his access 
rights of different websites. Assumption made in MP-Auth is 
that account and password setup is secure. Users should setup 
an account and password by personal communication with the 
bank to initialize their account or bank will provide passwords 
through postal service. 
Justin Martineau et al. [5] proposed a system in which the 
user‟s home/office computer works as a trusted proxy that 
authenticates the user to the service; user is trying to access 
from the un-trusted machine. The user‟s authentication details, 
such as usernames and passwords for sites and services are kept 
and protected on the proxy. When a user requests access to a 
secure website from the un-trusted machine, the proxy will fill 
in the authentication details on behalf of the user, provided the 
un-trusted machine provides a valid response to the proxy‟s one 
time password challenge. The user‟s mobile device computes 
correct response to this challenge; it is initialized with a onetime 
password program in union with the proxy. Both the proxy and 
the mobile device are in sync with respect to the one time 
password generation. If the response to the challenge matches 
the value computed by the proxy then the proxy supplies the 
proper authentication details to the trusted web site. Thus users 
can authenticate to internet services without disclosing any long 
time passwords to the untrusted machine. The scheme prevents 
the un-trusted machine from capturing and reusing the user‟s 
passwords and other authentication data but does not guarantee 
that the user‟s password was used for authenticating to the user 
specified website, e.g., the user could have sent the one time 
password for www.amazon.com, while the un-trusted machine 
could have modified the destination address to www.buy.com 
and still sent the valid one time password. The proxy wouldn‟t 
be able to detect this modification and would supply the 
authentication details for www.buy.com. In order to thwart this 
attack, the one-time password used for authentication must be 
dependent upon both the user‟s secret key and the site the user 
is trying to access. This can be accomplished using AES. 
System faces a problem of the overhead of site encryption for 
secure site identification. 
oPass [1] provides users with a mechanism to authenticate 
from an un-trusted machine to an Internet service without 
revealing confidential user information which uses a user‟s 
cell phone and short message service (SMS) to prevent 
password stealing and password reuse attacks. We can say that 
it is difficult to prevent password reuse attacks from any 
scheme where the users need to recall something. We also 
state that reason behind password stealing is when users type 
passwords to untrusted public computers. Therefore, aim of 
oPass is free users from having to remember or type any 
passwords into malicious computers for authentication. 
Different from common user authentication, oPass involves a 
new element, the cell phone which is used to generate one-
time passwords and a new communication medium, SMS 
which is used to transmit authentication messages. The 
telecommunication service provider (TSP) plays a role in the 
registration and recovery phases. The TSP acts as a link 
between subscribers and web servers. It offers a service for 
subscribers to execute the registration and recovery process 
with each web service, e.g., a subscriber inputs her id 𝐼𝐷𝑢and 
a web server‟s id  𝐼𝐷𝑠  to start the registration phase. 
Afterwards, the TSP forwards the request and the user‟s phone 
number to the related web server based on the received   𝐼𝐷𝑠. 
Still, oPass is vulnerable to the attacks possible due to the SSL 
channel and requires more secure connection with low 
communication overhead. 
OTHER RELATED WORK.  Also, the other parallel researches 
have given different methods to avoid phishing attacks. 
SessionMagnifier is a technique that facilitates extended 
browser on a mobile device along with a regular browser on a 
public computer that work together to secure a web session 
[14]. SessionMagnifier detaches user access to very sensitive 
interactions (online banking or payment) from the regular 
interactions (web surfing or photo viewing). For very sensitive 
interactions, the information is always sent to the extended 
browser on the users‟ mobile device for further verification. 
Another approach is adopting TPM (Trusted Platform 
Module). McCune et al. developed a system which is known 
as a bump in ether (BitE) adopted TPM [15]. BitE facilitates, 
all user inputs will be protected under an encrypted tunnel, a 
secure connection between the mobile device and an 
application running on a TPM based untrustworthy computer. 
Track 4:  Mobile and Wireless Communication 
 
Third Post Graduate Symposium on Computer Engineering cPGCON2014 Organized by department of Computer Engineering, 
MCERC Nasik 
 
3 
Garriss et al. designed another system based on TPM and 
virtual machine (VM) technologies [16], to guarantee 
trustworthiness of public kiosks for secure computing.  
 
III. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS  
The proposed system is novel architecture for a user 
authentication to thwart phishing and password reusing attacks. 
The purpose of protocol is to avoid users from typing their 
memorized passwords into public kiosks. By adopting one-time 
passwords, password information is no longer useful. A one-
time password is expired when the user finishes the current 
session. Different from using internet channels, leverages SMS 
and user‟s cell phones to prevent password stealing attacks.  We 
believe SMS is a secure and suitable medium to pass on 
important information between cell phones and websites. Based 
on SMS, a user identity is authenticated by websites without 
inputting any passwords to untrusted kiosks. User password is 
only used to limit access on the user‟s cell phone. In system, 
each user simply memorizes a long-term password to access her 
cell phone. The long-term password is used to guard the 
information on the cell phone from a theft. 
The assumptions made in system are as follows. 
1) Every web server owns a unique phone number. 
Through a SMS channel, users can interact with each 
website using the phone number. 
2) The telecommunication service provider plays a role in 
the registration and recovery phases. The TSP module is 
a link between subscribers and web servers which 
resides at server only. It offers a service for subscribers 
to perform the registration and recovery progress with 
each web service e.g., a subscriber inputs her id 𝐼𝐷𝑢     
and a web server‟s id 𝐼𝐷𝑠 to execute the registration 
phase. Afterwards, the TSP module sends the request 
and the subscriber‟s phone number to the related web 
server based on the received   𝐼𝐷𝑢 . 
3) Subscriber‟s (i.e., users) establishes connection to the 
server with TSP module through 3G connections. 
4) If a user loses her cell phone, he can inform his service 
provider (TSP) to disable her misplaced SIM card and 
keeps a new card with the same phone number. Hence, 
the user finishes the recovery phase. 
 
A. System Overview 
Unlike general web logins, system makes use of a user‟s cell 
phone as an authentication token and SMS as a secure 
communicating medium. In the registration phase, a user starts 
the program to register his new account on the website, she 
desires to access later. Contrasting with conventional 
registration, the server asks for the user‟s account id and phone 
number, in spite of password. After filling out the registration 
form, the program asks the user to enter a long-term password. 
A chain of one-time passwords for next logins on a target server 
is generated by using long-term password. Afterwards, the 
program involuntarily sends a registration SMS to the server to 
finish the registration procedure. The registration SMS is 
encrypted to provide data confidentiality. A recovery phase is 
designed to fix problems in some circumstances, such as losing 
one‟s cell phone.  
Contrasting with common cases, login process in system does 
not require users to type passwords into an untrusted web 
browser. The user name is the only input information to the 
browser. Further, the user starts the program on her phone and 
enters the long-term password; the program will produce a one-
time password and send a login SMS safely to the server. The 
login SMS is encrypted by using the one-time password. 
At last, the cell phone receives a response message from the 
server and shows a success message on her screen if the server 
is able to confirm her identity. The message is used to guarantee 
that the website is an authorized website and not a phishing one. 
We follow same system overview as that of the overview 
presented in oPass [1]. Procedure of each phase is presented as 
below.  
 
B. Registration Phase 
Fig.1 describes registration phase. This phase aims to allow a 
user and a server to agree on a shared secret to authenticate 
subsequent logins for this user. The user opens the program on 
her cell phone. She inputs 𝐼𝐷𝑢  (account id) and 𝐼𝐷𝑠  (generally 
the website URL or domain name) to the program. The mobile 
application then sends 𝐼𝐷𝑢  and 𝐼𝐷𝑠 to the telecommunication 
service provider (TSP) which is a module at server only; 
through a 3G connection to ask for a registration request. The 
TSP module got the 𝐼𝐷𝑢  and the  𝐼𝐷𝑠 , it is able to trace the 
user‟s phone number 𝑇𝑢  based on user‟s SIM card. The TSP 
module acts as the third-party to distribute a shared secrete key 
𝐾𝑠𝑑  between the user and the server. Encrypt the registration 
SMS with AES-CBC by using the shared secrete key   𝐾𝑠𝑑 . 
Then the TSP sends   𝐼𝐷𝑢 , 𝑇𝑢and  𝐾𝑠𝑑  to the related server. 
Server will produce the related information for this particular 
account and reply with a response, containing server‟s 
identity𝐼𝐷𝑠 , a random seed  ∅ and server‟s phone number    𝑇𝑠. 
The TSP then sends𝐼𝐷𝑠 ,𝑇𝑠 , ∅ and a shared secrete key  𝐾𝑠𝑑  to 
the cell phone. After the response is received, the user can enter 
a long-term password 𝑃𝑢  in his cell phone.  
The cell phone calculates a secret credential  
𝐶 by the following operation:  
 
                               C = H Pu IDs ∅                                      1  
 
The cell phone encrypts the computed credential 𝐶 with the 
key 𝐾𝑠𝑑  and generates the corresponding MAC, i.e., HMAC. 
HMAC-SHA1 obtains input user‟s identity, cipher text and IV 
to output the MAC [17], [18] and prepares this as a secure 
registration SMS. Then, the encrypted registration SMS is sent 
to the server by phone number 𝑇𝑠 as follows:  
 
Cell phone
SMS
   Server IDu ,   C  ∅  Ksd , IV, HMAC − SHA1  2  
 
The authenticity of the registration SMS is checked by 
decrypting it and then information is obtained with the shared 
secrete key   𝐾𝑠𝑑 . To avoid SMS spoofing attacks, Server 
checks the source of received SMS with     𝑇𝑢  . At last, the cell 
phone stores all information  𝐼𝐷𝑠 , 𝑇𝑠, ∅, 𝑖  excluding for the 
long-term password  𝑃𝑢   and the secret   𝐶. The current index of 
the one-time password is specified by variable  𝑖 and is initially 
set to 0. The server authenticates the user device during each 
login with   𝑖. On reception of the message (6), the server stores  
 𝐼𝐷𝑢, 𝑇𝑢, 𝐶, ∅, 𝑖  and finishes the registration phase. 
 
Fig. 1. Process of Registration Phase 
 
C. Login Phase 
Fig. 2 shows the detail flow of the login phase. The user starts 
by sending login request to the server through an untrusted 
browser (on a kiosk) with his account   𝐼𝐷𝑢 . Then, server 
supplies the 𝐼𝐷𝑠  and fresh nonce 𝑛𝑠 to the browser. In the 
meantime, this message is forwarded to the cell phone through 
Wireless or Bluetooth interfaces. After reception of the 
message, the cell phone checks related information from its 
database via 𝐼𝐷𝑠  which comprises server‟s phone number  𝑇𝑠 
and other parameters ∅, 𝑖 . After proper inquiry, it shows a 
dialog to enter a long-term password 
𝑃𝑢 . Insert a correct long- term password 𝑃𝑢on the cell phone to 
regenerate secrete shared credential   𝐶. The one-time password 
𝛿𝑖  for current login is recomputed using the following 
operations: 
                                  
                                C = H Pu IDs ∅                                      3  
𝛿𝑖 = 𝐻
𝑁…𝑖 𝐶                                         (4) 
 
𝛿𝑖  is only used for this login (ith login after user registered) and 
for encryption used as a secret key with AES-CBC. The cell 
phone produces a fresh nonce 𝑛𝑑  and encrypts 𝑛𝑑  and 𝑛𝑠 with 𝛿𝑖  
to generate the related MAC, i.e., HMAC and prepares a secure 
login SMS which is then sent to server S: 
 
Cell phone
SMS
   Server IDu ,  nd  ns   δi , IV, HMAC − SHA2 (5) 
 
The server recomputed 𝛿𝑖  (i.e.,𝛿𝑖 = 𝐻
𝑁…𝑖 𝐶 ) after 
receiving the login SMS to decrypt and confirms the 
authenticity of the login SMS. If the nonce 𝑛𝑠 received equal 
the prior generated nonce   𝑛𝑠, the user is valid one; else, the 
server will reject the login request. The server sends a success 
message through the internet, 𝐻  𝑛𝑑   𝛿𝑖    to the user‟s cell 
phone by successfully verifying user‟s identity. The cell phone 
checks the received message to finish the login procedure. The 
last verification on the cell phone avoids the phishing attacks 
and the man-in-the-middle attacks. If verification fails, the 
user knows a reason and the device would not increment the 
index   𝑖. After successful user login, index will automatically 
increase, 𝑖 = 𝑖 + 1 simultaneously in both the device and the 
server for synchronization of one-time password. To refresh 
one-time password, user and the server can reset random seed 
Ø by the recovery phase after specific period, 𝑁 − 1 rounds 
(where N is pre-defined length of hash chain).  
 
Fig. 2. Process of Login Phase 
 
D. Recovery Phase 
Recovery phase is important and required in some particular 
conditions (e.g., a user may lose her cell phone.). The system 
can recover setting on her new cell phone (apply a new SIM 
card with old phone number (Number portability)). When user 
installs the program on new cell phone and launches the 
application, user asks for a recovery request with same previous 
account 𝐼𝐷𝑢   and requested server 𝐼𝐷𝑠   to TSP module through a 
3G connection. As we stated earlier that 𝐼𝐷𝑠  can be the domain 
name or URL link of server. Same in the registration process, 
TSP module can trace user‟s phone number 𝑇𝑢based on her SIM 
card and sends user‟s account 𝐼𝐷𝑢  and 𝑇𝑢  to server through a 
functional call. After getting the request, server searches the 
account information in its database to verify if account is 
previously registered or not. If account 𝐼𝐷𝑢  is already there then 
the information used to calculate the secret credential will be 
extracted and be returned to the user. The server produces fresh 
nonce 𝑛𝑠 and replies with a message which contains𝐼𝐷𝑠 ,Ø, 𝑇𝑠, 𝑖 
and 𝑛𝑠. This message contains all the required parameters to 
produce the next one-time passwords to the user.  
Same in the registration process, the mobile application 
receives the message; it asks the user to enter his long-term 
password to regenerate the correct one-time password  𝛿𝑖+1 
(presuming the last successful login before user lost his cell 
phone is 𝛿𝑖). Lastly, the user‟s cell phone produces a cipher text 
by encrypting the secret credential and server nonce 𝑛𝑠 and sent 
it back as a recovery message to the server for verification. 
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Likewise, the server calculates 𝛿𝑖+1 and decrypts this recovery 
message to confirm that user is already recovered. Now, user‟s 
new cell phone is recovered successfully and now ready to 
execute further logins. For the subsequent user login, one-time 
password  𝛿𝑖+2 will be used. Fig. 3 shows the detail flow of the 
recovery phase. Fig. 3 shows the detail flow of the recovery 
phase.  
 
E. Platform 
Platform: Windows (Windows 7, Windows XP) 
Tools for programming: Android 2.2 SDK and its emulator 
must be installed, Eclipse IDE (versions 3.5.1 and higher), 
SQLite database, Apache server, MYSQL database. 
Hardware: Processor-Intel Core2 Duo, RAM-1GB, Android 
device osv2.0 and above, GSM modem. 
 Technology: Java, Html, Xml, Android API, PHP, SMSLib          
(Open source library).  
 
Fig. 3. Process of Recovery Phase 
  
IV. RESULT ANALYSIS 
Table I evaluates our system with earlier systems indicating avoided attacks. Symbol „ ‟ shows that the system avoids attacks, and „ ‟ 
represents “not applicable”. Table II compares our system with earlier systems for requirements. Symbol „ ‟ indicates the special 
requisites, and „ ‟ represents “not applicable”.  
 
Comparing our system with previous research 
 
TABLE I 
 
System Attack Prevention 
Session hijacking Phishing Key-logging Password reuse DNS spoofing Malware 
prevention 
Our system       
oPass [1]       
MP- 
Auth [4] 
      
Phool 
Proof [2] 
      
Secure Web[3]       
BitE [15]       
Garriss et al.[16]       
Session 
Magnifier[14] 
      
Secure 
Pass [5] 
      
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
 
UICC STANDS FOR USER INVOLVEMENT IN CERTIFICATE CONFIRMATION 
TPM STANDS FOR TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE 
System Requirements 
UICC Physical account 
setup 
Logical account setup TPM On device 
secret 
Trusted proxy Malware free 
mobile 
Our system 
 
       
oPass [1] 
 
       
MP- 
Auth [4] 
       
Phool 
Proof [2] 
       
Secure Web[3] 
 
       
BitE [15] 
 
       
Garriss et al.[16] 
 
       
Session 
Magnifier[14] 
       
Secure 
Pass [5] 
       
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE 
This paper proposes a novel architecture for secure user 
authentication avoiding possible threats. It uses the concept of 
two-factor authentication, one-time password and 
telecommunication services along with web services. This 
methodology of authentication is safe and reliable; provides 
high data confidentiality. Users need not to type any passwords 
into untrusted computers for login on all websites; without the 
secret code of the user account, no one can extract the data. 
System implements the one-time password approach to ensure 
independence between each login session. Compared with 
earlier methods, the user authentication protocol effectively 
prevents password stealing (i.e., phishing, key logger) and reuse 
attacks. Password recovery is also provided when users lose 
their cell phones to produce fully functional system. User can 
recover system with reissued SIM cards and long-term 
passwords. In current internet environment most of the users are 
familiar with systems are accessible by using two-factors 
(tokens). Hence, in the future work, we plan to implement a 
system works on multi-parameters to authenticate user e.g., 
three-factor authentication (Biometric) and more secure 
techniques for secure message transmission.  
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